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Two prescriptions dominate the topic of what firms should do next in uncertain situations:
planning approaches and adaptive approaches. These differ primarily on the appropriate role
of prediction in the decision process. Prediction is a central issue in strategy making owing to
the presumption that what can be predicted can be controlled. In this paper we argue for the
independence of prediction and control. This implies that the pursuit of successful outcomes can
occur through control-oriented approaches that may essentially be non-predictive. We further
develop and highlight control-oriented approaches with particular emphasis on the question of
what organizations should do next. We also explore how these approaches may impact the costs
and risks of firm strategies as well as the firm’s continual efforts to innovate. Copyright  2006
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Among the most difficult challenges in business is
creating strategy for the future of an organization
that is doing well. No pending doom, rallying cry,
or clear problem to solve. How do we know where
to go from here? In many of these situations the
question isn’t asked or answered, the course simply
maintained until a challenge or opportunity crashes
into the organization. In others, however, a lot of
effort is put into this innocent little question. What
to do next?
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Williamson (1998: 49) formalizes this as a ‘level
III’ resource-based question:
How should firm A, with its pre-existing strengths
and weaknesses, reposition for the future in rela-
tion to the strategic situation (actual and poten-
tial rivalry; actual and potential market niches) of
which it is a part or to which it can relate?
The question has also been formulated in other
ways: How can a firm sustain its competitive
advantage over time? How can a firm remain
effectively matched to a changing environment?
And so on. These are different ways of asking the
same fundamental question: How can a firm know
what to do next?
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Imagine, for example, the situation of a local
radio station. Let’s call it KEEP180.
KEEP180 has established a solid market posi-
tion, anchored in a passion for new and cre-
ative music of all types. From its roots as a col-
lege station, it has found a very unique identity
over the past decade. The station has no com-
mercials; instead funded by listeners and ‘day
sponsor’ corporate sponsorship, mostly from local
businesses. A unique mix of music covers many
genres (from Alternative to Reggae to Country to
French rap, most of it very novel) and substantiates
KEEP180’s motto of ‘where the music matters.’
Investment in an Internet presence has led to a
fast-growing worldwide popularity among a loyal
segment of music listeners. The station occasion-
ally broadcasts from other cities to support remote
Internet listeners. The local audience has expanded
to the next major city to the south through exten-
sion of its traditional broadcast. All of this has
inspired great loyalty among musicians and listen-
ers alike. Winning a Webby award has reinforced
KEEP180’s candidacy for being the best radio sta-
tion site in the world. What should this firm do
next?
Often we simply pass this question back to the
owners of the firm: they should pursue whatever
they want to, their preferences. This begs the
question from the managers of KEEP180: what
should we prefer to do next? Owner-managers may
have a clear high-level goal of continuing to be
successful. In our example, this might be stated
as: to share great music with the world. But this
does not meaningfully narrow their choices about
what to do next. The range of imagined choices
in pursuit of such high-level goals is central to
why the question is interesting. Decision makers
can have a pronounced impact on outcomes in
exactly these kinds of situations where discretion
is very high (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990).
Let us examine a few of the suggestions that
strategic management scholarship has to offer our
successful radio station:
• Suggestion #1A. If they could predict the future,
perhaps the managers of KEEP180 would know
exactly what to do. They could position their
firm to profit greatly from their predictive power;
buying the winning lottery ticket for tomorrow’s
lottery, so to speak. For example, if they could
reliably predict that all radio listening would
occur through the Internet in 4 years, they could
insightfully avoid moving into more transmit-
ters or buying radio stations and instead more
aggressively develop their broadband customer
base and content.
• Suggestion #1B. Of course, we know we can-
not ‘know’ this, and there’s the rub. All we can
do is make an educated guess. KEEP180, for
example, could work hard to analyze broadcast
market trends, track competitors, evaluate finan-
cial indicators, and assess their own strengths
and weaknesses for pursuing particular positions
in multiple future situations. Based on their best
estimates of what the future may bring, they
could choose to continue to invest in the broad-
band business to position for a world where 75
percent of radio listening occurs over the inter-
net in the next 4–6 years.
• Suggestion #2A. Not all predictions are created
equal—in fact, if the history of Internet firms is
any indication, most predictions are erroneous
at best. As an alternative to investing in predic-
tion, our radio broadcasters could instead watch
how other radio stations are growing, examine
what formats are working well, and pay atten-
tion to what customers love right now. Being
particularly attentive to the situation they are
actually in, rather than guessing the future, man-
agers of KEEP180 might join in the consoli-
dation of the broadcast industry—buying other
stations, for example, or perhaps take advan-
tage of their Internet strength to create dozens
of different stations that reach many market seg-
ments.
• Suggestion #2B. One might even suggest they
do both, moving forward slowly on their short
list of possible ‘things to do next.’ If they keep
their options open they will be able to react
to real learning without betting the business
on predictions about Internet radio, yet keep
a foothold in the Internet market in case it
turns out to be a great opportunity. Likewise
they would be involved in the consolidation of
traditional radio stations in case that turns out to
be most attractive. This is particularly relevant
when the risk-adjusted expected values of the
short list of options are comparable.
A substantial proportion of strategy research is
devoted to this very discussion of how the radio
station can know what to do next, or how it can
reposition for the future. Scholars will recognize
the suggestions above as different operationaliza-
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tions of the classic planning and learning debates
over strategy making under different ‘degrees’ of
uncertainty (see Ansoff, 1991, as an example of
the former and Mintzberg, 1994, for the latter).
Both focus on the appropriate role of prediction
in the decision process. Planning looks at pre-
diction from a natural sciences standpoint, where
prediction is quite valuable. In this view, prediction
enables control, allowing us to choose the appro-
priate means to proceed toward desired outcomes.
Learning, which enables adaptation, comes at pre-
diction from the opposite direction, avoiding it as
much as possible. Adaptation argues that, in chang-
ing environments, moving faster to adapt will lead
organizations forward more effectively than trying
harder to predict.
We begin this paper with a review of strategic
management research to clarify the role of pre-
diction in deciding what to do next. In particular,
we show that prediction is fundamental to current
conceptions of how to control future outcomes. We
then turn the tables by separating the dimensions of
prediction and control (see Figure 1). We use the
resultant taxonomy to explore KEEP180’s answer
to its question of what to do next and examine
implications for future research.
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
THEORIES: THE ROLE OF
PREDICTION
Studies in mainstream strategic management boil
down to two fundamental prescriptions for how
firms can decide what to do next (Brews and
Hunt, 1999): They should either try harder to
predict better (rational strategies advocated by
the planning school) or move faster to adapt bet-
ter (adaptive strategies espoused by the learn-
ing school). Which prescription a firm is to fol-
low depends upon how confident the firm is in
its ability to predict changes in its environment.
Whether stated as distinct or as a continuum from
deliberate to emergent (Mintzberg and Waters,
1985), a key characteristic of both adaptive and
planning approaches is their emphasis on posi-
tioning the organization within an exogenously
given environment. The two approaches differ pri-
marily in how they cope with that given uncer-
tainty.
We drew the above conclusion based on an
extensive literature review. We began the review
with a citation search of two major databases
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to building a possible future
Move faster to adapt to a
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Figure 1. Framework of prediction and control
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using broad conceptual keywords—namely,
‘strategy making,’ ‘strategy formulation,’ and
‘strategy design.’ We searched seven peer-review-
ed journals (SMJ, AMJ, AMR, ASQ, MS, OS, and
JIBS) and three practitioner journals (HBR, CMR,
and SMR) in all. This resulted in 169 articles. To
this, we added 18 articles suggested by strategic
management scholars we consulted. We then itera-
tively narrowed the search by reading the abstracts
to eliminate irrelevant articles, and grouping rele-
vant articles that overlapped on key ideas. Finally
we worked through the relevant articles in full,
from which we identified 16 articles that exem-
plified cornerstone approaches to strategy making,
although there is certainly some overlap in their
positions. In some cases, a book summarizes the
position from several of an author’s articles and
was used as a reference point. Each of the final
16 (listed in the Appendix and organized into four
categories that will be explicated later in the paper)
addresses the question of overarching interest to
us, namely, how organizations can decide what do
to next.
Assumptions about prediction and control are
either explicit or implicit in virtually all formu-
lations of strategic management research. So the
focus of our literature analysis was on extracting
those positions. Quotes from each article are pre-
sented in the Appendix to encapsulate the emphasis
of each article with regard to prediction and con-
trol as the two concepts are discussed throughout
this paper.
We began our analysis by positioning exemplar
articles graphically along the dimension of predic-
tion (high and low), as presented in the left-hand
side (LHS) of Figure 2. For the moment, we will
ignore the right-hand side (RHS) and return to it

































(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997)
Shaping Strategies
(Courtney et al., 1997)
Value Curve Creation
(Kim and Maubourgne, 1997)
Strategic Projection




(Tellis and Golder, 2002)
Corporate Imagination
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1991)
Backing into the Future
(Hayes, 1985)
Figure 2. Representative literature on specific approaches to situational control




The planning school is perhaps the oldest in strate-
gic management and contains several widely read
pieces such as Ansoff (1979) and Porter (1980),
who emphasize the importance of systematic anal-
ysis and integrative planning. Discipline in the
generation of alternatives, rational evaluation of
important information, and significant integration
into a firm’s existing operations are earmarks of
the rational planning process (Andrews, 1987;
Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Ansoff, 1991;
Miller and Cardinal, 1994). In these approaches,
more attention to situational detail, more frequent
analysis, more scanning for trends, and evalua-
tion of more alternatives guide the firm to their
best possible strategy going forward (Schendel and
Hofer, 1979), and a set of ‘no regrets’ moves
(Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie, 1997).
The rational planning view predicts that as
uncertainty increases, organizations that work more
diligently to analyze and predict more accurately
the changing situation in which they operate will
outperform those that do not. Several empirical
studies support this notion. Goll and Rasheed
(1997) looked at the use of rational decision-
making efforts through surveys of 62 manufac-
turing firms, evaluating the relationship of those
efforts to return on sales and return on assets
under different levels of environmental munifi-
cence and dynamism. They found that rational
decision making positively impacted performance
as dynamism increased. Similarly, Brews and Hunt
(1999) found, through a survey of 426 man-
agers enrolled in 39 executive education programs,
that more specificity in the planning process was
related to increased financial market performance
vs. competitors over the prior 5–10 years. Also,
Priem, Rasheed, and Kotulic (1995) report results
from their study of 63 manufacturing firms where
increased rationality in terms of scanning, analy-
sis, and comprehensiveness in the strategy process
was related to increased performance on several
measures of performance relative to their peers,
especially in dynamic situations. Similar results
are reported in the Miller and Cardinal (1994)
meta-analysis of 26 planning vs. learning stud-
ies; planning rationality is related to profitability
even in turbulent environments. Additional notable
studies of these relationships include Miller and
Friesen, (1983), Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson
(1987) and Dean and Sharfman (1996), where they
looked specifically at decision effectiveness lon-
gitudinally, rather than overall firm performance.
Broadly these findings suggest that rational plan-
ning can guide organizations to successfully repo-
sition for the future even in uncertain situations.
Champions of these notions make two key argu-
ments for the enhanced role of rational plan-
ning with renewed vigor under uncertainty. First,
short cuts, such as intuition, heuristics, and other
avenues for handling the challenge, suffer from
numerous personal and group biases (Staw, 1981;
Schwenk, 1984; Bazerman, 1990). Systematic
planning processes help to overcome the gaps and
inconsistencies that can result from these biases
(Ansoff, 1979; Priem et al., 1995). The predictive
approach may not be perfect because prediction
is obviously difficult, but it represents the best
method of remaining effectively ‘aligned’ with
one’s environment (Hough and White, 2003). Sec-
ond, even if prediction is too inaccurate to be
useful for strategy making under uncertainty, the
discipline and systematic nature of rational plan-
ning is a valuable frame for the development and
evaluation of emergent strategies (Ansoff, 1991;
Szulanksi and Amin, 2001).
Adapting
The learning school, as opposed to the planning
school, suggests organizations learn what to do
next by minimizing the use of predictive rational-
ity, and instead experimenting and moving quickly
to capture new opportunities (Mosakowski, 1997).
By being flexible and adaptive to situations as they
develop, organizations successfully out-maneuver
competitors who also struggle to deal with the
challenge of an uncertain future (Fredrickson and
Mitchell, 1984; Nutt, 1976). Purely adaptive ap-
proaches avoid defining future event spaces, and
instead position the firm for quick responses to
uncertain and unpredictable events as they emerge.
The basic strategic principle of adaptive ap-
proaches is incrementalism, as emphasized by
Lindblom (1959), Quinn (1980), and Mintzberg
(1978): the firm learns from environmental feed-
back; and subsequent strategy reflects this learning.
As the cycle of action and feedback is short, adap-
tive approaches emphasize recognizing where the
environment is rather than predicting where it will
be, placing a premium on rapid adaptation rather
than strategic intentions (Schoemaker, 2002).
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Adaptation research argues that in dynamic and
uncertain situations planning slows adaptation and
that comprehensive planning can actually blind the
organization to important changes in its environ-
ment (Mintzberg, 1990; Schoemaker, 1993). Also,
predictions lead to commitments that lock orga-
nizations into planned strategy despite acknowl-
edging huge challenges in making the predictions
that justify those commitments. In this case, even
if organizations see the need to make changes in
their plan, they may not be able to effectively
adapt (Ghemawat, 1999; Christensen and Bower,
1996). Boeker (1989) referred to the effects of
these commitments as ‘imprinting’ and showed
that as strategies are set up they lock in and firms
are subsequently much less likely to adapt.
Empirical support for adaptive approaches to
strategy making in uncertain situations is also sig-
nificant. In two studies, Fredrickson and Mitchell
(1984) and Fredrickson and Iaquinto (1989) look-
ed at the consequences of comprehensive strategy
making using a decision scenario survey with man-
agers from firms in two industries, differing in
the extent of instability. In both cross-sectional
and longitudinal evaluations, they found compre-
hensive planning efforts were negatively related
to performance in unstable environments. Miller
(1993), through interviews with 53 firms, found
that more successful firms were significantly more
adaptive. Hough and White (2003), in an experi-
mental design with 219 participants making 400
decisions, reported that a more comprehensive
rational decision approach only enhanced decision
quality in certain, rather than uncertain, situations.
Also, based on an in-depth review of 8 of the 10
major oil companies, Grant (2003) reports that all
of the firms have responded to increasing indus-
try uncertainty by de-emphasizing their planning
approach in exchange for more adaptive and flex-
ible solutions, establishing a balance of corporate
strategy guidelines and pure emergent strategy in
what he refers to as ‘planned emergence.’ This
notion of planned emergence, combining predic-
tive planning with adaptive approaches, has grown
significantly over the past decade and offers inter-
esting combinations of the two approaches.
Bridging planning and adaptation
Several streams of research point to planned emer-
gence as a concept that bridges the gap between
planning and adaptive approaches. Studies of fast
decision making show that in dynamic situations
decision makers actually can arrive at faster deci-
sions by pursuing a strategy-making process with
many of the hallmarks of rationality (Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Fast deci-
sion making allows for quick reactions to changing
environments, central to adaptation, while retain-
ing many of the rational strategy-making pro-
cesses: more alternatives, more information, and
more integration. Judge and Miller (1991) stud-
ied 32 hospital executives and found that fast and
comprehensive strategic decisions were related to
enhanced organizational performance. Similarly,
Baum and Wally (2003) used a scenario-based sur-
vey to assess decision speed with 318 CEOs from
1996 to 2000, to show that fast rational decision
making was related to higher profit and growth
performance.
Work on dynamic capabilities also presses the
notion of planned adaptation (Teece, Pisano, and
Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Ratio-
nal planning can focus on predictive strategies that
set the stage for fast adaptation. Organizations can
rationally plan and develop systems that facili-
tate innovation and change, for example, through
modular organizational structures that smooth sig-
nificant organizational challenges to change, and/or
establish formal but simple rules that guide the
evaluation and pursuit of emergent opportunities
(Simon, 1993; Eisenhardt and Sull, 2001). Sce-
nario planning echoes this theme of connecting
rational planning with effective adaptation by plan-
ning in advance for several scenarios that are indi-
vidually challenging to predict, thereby accelerat-
ing adaptation when uncertainty is reduced (Schoe-
maker 2002).
Real options techniques have further refined the
core approach of rational planning in uncertain
situations (McGrath, 1999). By looking at dif-
ferent exercise options for alternative scenarios
and their expected future outcomes, real options
attempt to retain flexibility while providing a
framework for decisions and valuation that is
premised on alternatives predicted by the deci-
sion maker. As a result, strategy making is less
dependent on any one prediction, and prepares
the organization for major decisions as new real-
time information becomes available. However, real
options approaches are still significantly predic-
tive as prediction underlies the estimated value
of each individual option, both financially and
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strategically; see Luehrman (1998) for an exam-
ple of the extent to which predicted information is
required.
This review of the planning vs. learning debate
lays out several issues with prediction as a core
aspect of strategy making. First, both planning
and adaptive approaches to strategy making cen-
ter around the appropriate role and/or effective-
ness of prediction. Second, empirical support exists
for the use of prediction as an effective way to
decide what to do next, even in uncertain situa-
tions; there is also significant support for adaptive
efforts. Third, several recent strategic approaches
attempt to resolve this conflict by connecting the
planning and adaptive approaches, encouraging
firms to carefully plan to quickly adapt. Finally,
both planning and adaptive strategies focus on
positioning within an environment that is exoge-
nous to the efforts of the organization. Under this
assumption of exogeneity, predicting and posi-
tioning are the logical ways for organizations to
seek control of their outcomes, and successfully
reposition for the future. In the next section we
relax the exogeneity assumption and suggest that
viewing the environments of an organization as
endogenous to the efforts of actors/organizations




The above insights from strategy research orig-
inate in observations about how managers have
consistently guided organizations to favorable out-
comes over time (Ansoff, 1965; Chandler, 1962).
Favorable outcomes were considered outcomes
that enhanced the survival prospects of organi-
zations (Fligstein, 1996) and their profitability
(Porter, 1980). Strategy was defined as the ‘big
decisions’ made in the pursuit of these outcomes.
As pointed out earlier, prediction has played a
central role in crafting strategy. At least in prin-
ciple, predicting the organization’s environment
enables them to position for the future in order to
produce favorable outcomes. Cornerstones of this
predictive effort involve predicting responses of
competing firms, the path of market development
(especially demand) with its attendant opportuni-
ties and threats, and factors affecting the costs of
resources.
Deterministic frameworks in strategic manage-
ment all share a basic conception: prediction is use-
ful in strategy making because the consequences
of what can be predicted can be controlled. This
approach mirrors science, where prediction is used
to test theories about causal connections in the
natural environment and those theories are then
used either to manipulate nature for our ends, or to
safely position ourselves against the uncontrollable
forces of nature. As managers face uncertainties in
market environments, then, successful prediction
of that environment enables them to navigate it,
and to preemptively capture the resources that will
become valuable, leading to continued favorable
outcomes for the organization.
Naturally, these efforts in strategy draw on a
deep history of thinking about chance and uncer-
tainty. Written scholarship on how to make good
decisions under uncertainty can be traced back
at least to 1654, when Blaise Pascal wrote to
Pierre Fermat about a gambling problem that
launched the development of mathematical prob-
ability (Gigerenzer et al., 1990). Hacking (1975)
chronicles the endeavors of gamblers, scientists,
philosophers, and kings to identify predictable pat-
terns in nature and human behavior that allow
them to produce desirable outcomes. It has become
one of the basic tenets of science—from celestial
mechanics to economics and management—that
prediction and control are tied together, that they
are co-extensive.
Yet, the practical usefulness of prediction as
a means of control depends crucially on certain
features of the environment (Mintzberg, 1994).
Empirically, ‘How to achieve control, and how
much control is achievable, depends upon the fore-
sight horizon’ (Lane and Maxfield, 1996: 217).
When the strategist’s foresight horizon appears rel-
atively certain, prediction and control appear to
have a co-extensive relationship. As this horizon
becomes more uncertain, the relationship between
prediction and control changes. In highly uncer-
tain environments, such as those characterized
by complexity (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999), rife
with strong path dependencies and punctuated
change, the independence of control from predic-
tion becomes stark. How control over outcomes is
achieved in these settings changes. Efforts to con-
trol, directly working to create and influence the
evolution of market elements, can be seen more
clearly as competing alternatives to prediction for
achieving favorable outcomes.
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The conceptual framework for understanding
prediction and control as distinct dimensions is
grounded in Frank Knight’s (1921) seminal work
on the relationship between unpredictability and
profit. Knight identified three types of uncer-
tainty: the first consisting of known distribu-
tions and unknown draws, the second consist-
ing of unknown distributions and unknown draws,
and the third consisting of non-existent distribu-
tions where the very instances are unclassifiable
(subsequently known as Knightian uncertainty).
Knight’s first two categories of uncertainty par-
allel the mathematical notions of classical proba-
bility and statistical probability; they also suggest
scientists’ and philosophers’ distinctions between
the known and the unknown. The third type of
uncertainty—which has recently attracted interest
from scientists attempting to work out quantum
mechanics and its attendant theoretical puzzles—is
the unknowable, summarized in Ralph Gomory’s
1995 Scientific American article, ‘The known, the
unknown, and the unknowable.’
In biology, economics and social philosophy,
analyses of this type of uncertainty consistently
conceptualize it as a product of purposeful human
creative action (Lewontin, 1992; Buchanan and
Vanberg, 1991; Joas, 1996). In this third case,
efforts to predict are distinctly severed from efforts
to control. In environments characterized by
Knightian uncertainty, prediction and control are
not just empirically mismatched; they are concep-
tually at odds. Prediction can never be adequate for
the purpose of control, even in principle, because
of the role of human creative action in actually pro-
ducing a non-existent, not just a hard-to-predict,
future.
The conceptual co-extensiveness of prediction
and control depends on classifying the environ-
ment as a dichotomy consisting of ‘knowns’ and
‘unknowns.’ Based on these classifications, it is
in principle always possible to make predictions
(even if it takes time to learn how to do it
well), and use prediction as a means of control-
ling outcomes. In environments characterized by
Knightian uncertainty, however, the very instances
are unclassifiable. While after an innovative event
occurs we may conclude that we could certainly
have classified and predicted the probabilities of
its success or failure, Knightian uncertainty refers
to the actual instance of innovation (the pet rock,
the Internet, Google) as unclassifiable (Buchanan
and Vanberg, 1991). There simply was no category
of ‘pet rock’ to which we could assign probabilities
ex ante. In settings of true uncertainty strategists
of course still seek favorable outcomes, but this
may result from directly shaping these categories
rather than predicting their probable shapes and
navigating those probability estimates.
To the extent we seek to understand reality as
exogenous to human action, unknowability (true
unpredictability) can be a disquieting and disrup-
tive phenomenon. However, if we focus on human
action as a primary factor in the creation of real-
ity, we then need to develop approaches that don’t
involve prediction—i.e., to explore the potential of
non-predictive techniques for generating favorable
outcomes (March, 1982).
The practical meaning of predicting and control-
ling future events can be illustrated by reexamining
the KEEP180 example that began the paper. Let
us for a moment assume that the radio station car-
ries out market research predicting an explosion in
a new genre of French music. It can then invest
in bringing that music to its audience and con-
sequently capitalize on higher ratings. Prediction
efforts can include modeling a future event space,
estimating probabilities for events, and evaluat-
ing consequences, as well as more sophisticated
portfolio strategies, initiation of multiple contin-
gent efforts, and refining probability estimates over
time. Alternatively, the producer at KEEP180 may
simply love the French language, and leverage
friendships with an executive at a French record-
ing label and a current American music icon to
create an explosion in French rap music and profit
from a distribution relationship. Both cases involve
beliefs about what is possible, but the first strategy
operates primarily on the prediction of the future
market, while the second operates primarily on the
interest in and ability to create that future market.
In both cases, actors want to guide themselves
towards favorable outcomes; our argument is sim-
ply that prediction is not the only point of lever-
age in achieving those outcomes. Planning and/or
adapting to succeed in an essentially exogenous
environment might be effective, but attempting
to significantly influence/control an endogenous
environment directly may also lead to favorable
outcomes. Control over favorable outcomes need
not be co-extensive to the efficacy or even neces-
sity of prediction. Putting prediction and control
on separate dimensions clarifies these approaches,
while showing how they relate to more traditional
strategic approaches. Figure 1, alluded to earlier,
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outlines our framework and suggests four key
approaches for strategic managers:
1. They can assume the environment is beyond
their control and predictable, investing in pre-
dictive techniques that allow them to position
favorably for the future—we call these plan-
ning strategies. Example: Walmart’s original
push into C&D tier markets with supply chain
expertise.
2. They can assume the environment is unpre-
dictable, shorten their planning horizons, and
invest in flexible strategies that effectively res-
pond to changes in the environment—we call
these adaptive strategies. Example: Dell’s cre-
ation of a build-to-order PC system, and orga-
nization to support it.
3. They can assume the environment is predictable
but malleable and impose their vision of the
future, shaping the environment to achieve
their desired outcomes—we call these vision-
ary strategies. Example: Microsoft’s initial push
toward a PC on every desk.
4. They can assume future environmental factors
are largely non-existent, and seek to create them
through cooperation and goal creation with oth-
ers to imagine possible futures extending from
current means—we call these transformative
strategies. Example: Uhaul’s creation of a one-
way truck rental business.
On the right-hand side (RHS) of Figures 1 and 2,
the two approaches emphasizing control are referr-
ed to as construction because they tend to more
clearly focus on the types of efforts actors may
pursue to create their future, at least in part. Con-
struction represents this well as it not only calls to
mind ideas of social construction, but also the more
straightforward idea that markets develop through
the construction of artifacts such as organizations
and surrounding institutions, patterns of exchange,
and preferences of important stakeholders. Not sur-
prisingly, much of the work relating to control as
an approach to repositioning for the future orig-
inates in research related to entrepreneurship and
new markets. In an entrepreneurial setting, not only
is prediction difficult, but efforts to directly con-
struct the future of those structures and traditions
may be particularly effective. These situations have
been shown to present greater managerial discre-
tion, allowing actor/organizations to pursue unique
approaches to influence their environment (Finkel-
stein and Hambrick 1990). With this in mind, we
turn to a more detailed exposition of the RHS of
Figures 1 and 2.
EMPHASIZING CONTROL
The word ‘construction’ immediately brings to
mind images of blueprints and visions as well
as the proper materials and methods to transform
them into reality. Construction evokes means–ends
relationships rather than organism–environment
interactions invoked by positioning concepts such
as planning and adaptation. While positioning
deals with the relative emphasis on prediction and
navigating an exogenous environment, construc-
tion deals with deliberate efforts to make the envi-
ronment endogenous. In this section, we outline
two different approaches to construction: vision-
ary strategy, and strategy as transformation. These
approaches differ depending on the existence and
clarity of goals, the availability and quality of
means, and the skills of the constructor (strate-
gist).1
As opposed to an exogenous evolving environ-
ment posited by positioning strategies, construc-
tive approaches assume either the non-existence
of key elements of the environment (presenting
opportunities for constructing them), or the orga-
nization’s ability to affect the evolution of those
elements in significant ways. Elements that orga-
nizations attend to most closely are those that
supply resources to the organization, particularly
markets for outputs. Mature output markets con-
sist of defined products and services (the artifacts
exchanged), a set of consumers with well-ordered
preferences (demand for products and services),
and a set of market structures and institutions
(such as distribution channels, product standards
and marketing practices) that facilitate exchange at
low transaction costs (Geroski, 2002; Coase, 1988;
North, 1990).
Construction strategies capture organizations’
efforts to shape the development of these mar-
ket elements over time with other market partici-
pants (Lazonick, 1991). For example, before the
1 In the language of Aristotelian causation, this sentence can
be rewritten as: In each of these, construction (formal cause)
depends on the availability and quality of means (material cause),
skills of the constructor (efficient cause), and the existence and
clarity of goals (teleology or final cause).
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invention of the Internet, while the market for
high-speed communication existed, most of the
products (e.g., e-mail) did not exist. Even after the
invention of the Internet, structures such as stan-
dardized protocols (e.g., IP addresses) and chan-
nels (e.g., ISPs) had to be invented before e-mail
could become a viable product. If we go back to
the first 15 years after the invention of the Internet,
not only did market structures not exist but also
demand itself had not been formulated in ways that
would connect the Internet with the need for high-
speed communications. It is plausible to hypothe-
size that well-organized preferences for digital vs.
other forms of communication were constructed
in a similar way to the construction of consumer
perceptions in Rosa et al.’s (1999) account of the
emergence of the minivan segment of the automo-
bile market.
Geroski (2002) has expressed this as the process
of transforming ‘inchoate’ demand into ‘articu-
lated’ demand, arguing that one key consequence
of new entrants rushing into emerging niches in
industries is the generation of product variety.
This variety enables users to sample and learn
which product variations best meet their needs
and more clearly articulate demand preferences.
Research has shown numerous ways in which pro-
ducers effect consumer preferences: preferences
are effected by the order of entry of competi-
tors into markets (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1989);
consumer preferences evolve based on the bas-
ket of available consumer products (Aversi et al.,
1999); advertising shapes preferences (Kotler,
1994); and organizations influence market take-
up of innovations by their choice of lead users
(von Hippel, 1986; Rogers, 1995). Assumptions
about the ability to influence these interlocking
components of the environment are fundamental
to construction, emphasizing control in deciding
what to do next.
As outlined on the RHS of Figures 1 and 2,
construction strategies differ in their emphasis
on prediction, thereby separated into Vision-
ary and Transformative strategies. Visionary
approaches have strong connections with predic-
tive approaches to strategy, and embody heroic
notions of insightful and persistent entrepreneurs
that seem to impose their will upon the world.
Transformative approaches focus on co-creating
goals with others in a mutually persuasive pro-
cess where action often precedes clear goals
and predicted outcomes. Actors using this type
of strategy transform extant means into new
futures.
Visionary approaches
Visionary approaches are more familiar to strategic
management than transformative ones. This type of
strategy emphasizes constructing an organization
and its environment by imagining future possibili-
ties and proactively bringing them to fruition. The
essence of vision is to set tremendous goals to cre-
ate and colonize new spaces in the environment.
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) articulate the approach
in their discussion of strategic intent:
Too often strategy is seen as a positioning exercise
in which options are tested by how they fit the
existing industry structure . . . The strategist’s goal
is not to find a niche within the existing industry
space, but to create a new space uniquely suited to
the company’s own strengths, space that is off the
map. (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989: 74)
The visionary approach simultaneously empha-
sizes high control and high prediction. The future
that comes to exist does so in large part sim-
ply because visionary leaders chose to create it.
In Will and Vision, Tellis and Golder (2002: 58)
state that ‘Vision is the starting point. It motivates
and directs [other factors].’ A steadfast commit-
ment to a particular vision guides prediction and
evaluation of alternative paths for achieving that
vision, and the persistent pursuit of the means
required to ‘make it happen.’ The oft-quoted defi-
nition of entrepreneurship as the pursuit of oppor-
tunity without regard to resources currently con-
trolled (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990) also captures
this idea. Clear goals and predictions form the
criteria for selecting between alternate means for
constructing favorable outcomes. Note for exam-
ple, ‘[W]hile strategic intent is clear about ends,
it is flexible as to means’ (Hamel and Prahalad,
1989: 68).
Several researchers have pointed to key suc-
cess factors involved in the visionary approach.
In assessing the impact of being a first mover in
a product market, Tellis and Golder (2002) his-
torically evaluated 66 different product categories.
They found that commitment to a clear vision, a
unique view of how things could be in the future,
supported by incredible persistence and willing-
ness to commit financial and reputation resources,
is key to enduring market leadership. Collins and
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Porras (1994) studied firms that created substan-
tial wealth from their founding, in matched pairs
with relatively underachieving firms. They also
showed that success involved ‘cult-like’ commit-
ment to a motivating vision of where the organi-
zation is taking the market, as opposed to posi-
tioning for where the market is heading. Rindova
and Fombrun (1999) describe the role of strategic
projections, where consistency between the com-
munication and resource commitments in line with
the organization’s vision is critical to increasing
reputation and a desire by others to support that
organization’s particular visionary efforts.
The RHS of Figure 2 lists representative re-
search for construction approaches that parallel
the research we identified earlier for positioning
on the LHS. As is obvious from the graphical
representation, research in the lower right-hand
quadrant of Figure 2 is rather sparse. One of the
challenges for this area is in articulating it as an
approach in which actors/organizations can actu-
ally engage a priori. Earlier influential research
in relation to construction of the future descrip-
tively outlines non-predictive action but not as a
proactive approach. Weick’s (1979) work on enact-
ment is a primary example. The challenge here
is to translate the description of human involve-
ment in the process of resolving the future into a
‘strategic approach’ that guides their influencing of
that process. Transforming represents an attempt at
this, emphasizing control and construction in the
absence of prediction.
Transformative approaches
Fortunately, preliminary steps have already been
taken by several eminent scholars. Simon (1996),
for example, explained in Sciences of the Artifi-
cial the importance of theories of non-predictive
design; and March (1978, 1982) has argued that a
technology of foolishness, both non-predictive and
non-visionary, might actually be useful. Sarasvathy
(2001a, 2001b) builds upon both Simon and March
to show how expert entrepreneurs use an effectual
logic that is transformative without calling for pre-
diction or vision in creating new markets and new
environments.
A small but growing number of empirical pro-
jects are pursuing research in this direction. ogilvie
(1998) describes an experimental design manip-
ulating the uncertainty faced by decision mak-
ers, and compares the outcomes of rational-logical
efforts with creative-action based ideas. The study
finds that in unstable situations decision makers
who emphasized an orientation toward creation
and action showed enhanced decision quality. Kim
and Maubourgne (1997) describe their work with
‘value curves’ which falls into the set of trans-
formative approaches. They suggest that strategies
are more effective as they move beyond reacting to
traditional market specifications of success, toward
leveraging means entirely toward overachieving
on co-created product features with customers and
leaving other predicted success factors out com-
pletely.
Our primary model for this quadrant comes from
Sarasvathy (2001a), Dew (2003), and Sarasvathy
and Dew (2005). These studies have worked out a
model of effectuation induced from two empirical
studies: one consisting of a think-aloud protocol
analysis of 27 expert entrepreneurs and the other
consisting of historical analyses of new markets
created by the Radio Frequency Identity industry.
The dynamic and interactive model of effectua-
tion, graphically presented in Figure 3, outlines a
specific process for how organizations can know
‘what to do next;’ the process is action oriented,
inter-subjective, and non-predictively transforms
an organization’s means into newly constructed
settings.
As Figure 3 shows, effectuation begins with
three categories of means: Identity; Knowledge;
and Networks. Actors begin with who they are,
what they know, and whom they know to imag-
ine things they can accomplish. This reflects an
emphasis on future events they can control rather
then those they can predict. For example, an
endocrinologist thinking of starting an obesity
clinic begins with the fact that she understands the
causes of obesity and some ideas for helping peo-
ple with the problem; a real estate professional may
also start an obesity clinic because he has found a
prime location next to a thriving teaching hospital
specializing in obesity research, but he is likely to
begin with possibilities suggested by the location
of the property rather than the needs of obese peo-
ple. The possible directions to take next emphasize
strategies of control, pieces of the future that they
can shape through their relatively unique abilities,
prior knowledge, and social network.
In the next step of the process, they start reach-
ing out to other people with a view to obtaining
input on how to proceed with some of the things
they could (possibly) do. The people they talk with
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Figure 3. A transformative approach: the effectual process—dynamic and interactive
could be potential stakeholders, friends and fam-
ily, or random people they meet in the routines of
their lives. As they find people who want to partic-
ipate in the efforts to build something (at this point
the ‘something’ may be vague or concrete, but
is always very much open to change) they move
toward obtaining actual commitments from these
potential stakeholders. What counts is the willing-
ness of stakeholders to commit to the construction
process; and not their fit with or alignment to
some pre-conceived vision or opportunity. Each
person who actually stakes something to come on
board contributes to shaping the vision and the
opportunity, as well as enabling and executing par-
ticular strategies to achieve them. Whatever each
stakeholder commits becomes a patch in a grow-
ing quilt whose pattern becomes meaningful only
through the continual negotiation and renegotiation
of its appeal to new stakeholders coming on board.
In other words, stakeholders commit resources in
exchange for a chance to reshape the goals of the
project, to influence what future will ultimately
result.
This process of negotiation and persuasion sets
up two cycles in the concurrent formation of a
new firm and new market: an expanding cycle that
increases the means available; and a converging set
of constraints on the goals of the growing stake-
holder network. These constraints help solidify
structures of the new market as well as clarify and
reorder preferences of stakeholders in the market.
At some point in the process, the converging cycle
ends the stakeholder acquisition process; there is
no more room for negotiating and maneuvering
the shape of what will be created, and path depen-
dency takes over. As the structures of the market
begin to take visible shape it may be important to
reevaluate the balance of prediction and control in
one’s strategic approach.
Stakeholder commitments drive the dynamics
of the effectual model. More fine-grained details
of the dynamic model are provided by three key
principles that stakeholders use. These principles
provide criteria for taking effectual action and
help stakeholders decide how to make effectual
commitments:
• Means-driven (rather than goal-oriented) action.
Each effectual stakeholder considers who he is,
what he knows, and whom he knows. Stakehold-
ers imagine possible courses of action based on
their means and engage others whose strategies
are driven by other types of identity, knowl-
edge, and networks. When exciting overlaps are
discovered and valuable new combinations are
engineered, stakeholders commit those elements
of their means that make worthwhile contribu-
tions to the new world being fabricated, thereby
enabling the fabrication. Initially, every stake-
holder interaction is as likely to change the
shape of the new market or artifact being created
as it is to change the original set of means.
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• Affordable loss (rather than expected return) as
evaluation criterion. Each effectual stakeholder
strives to invest only what he or she can afford
to lose. Since it is not clear at the early stages
of the effectual process what the pie will be, let
alone how much each piece will be worth down
the road, stakeholders cannot effectively use
expected return as their immediate criterion for
selecting resource investments. Instead, each has
to reconcile within his own mind whether they
can live with the loss of what they are investing
in the enterprise. This takes away the need to
predict what the returns will be; calculation of
affordable loss depends only on the investor’s
current situation and their subjective judgment
of what they are able to afford; it is entirely
within their control.
• Leveraging (rather than avoiding) contingen-
cies. Any environment and epoch in human
affairs contains unexpected contingencies; thus
predictions come with disclaimers about degrees
of confidence. While predictive efforts seek to
avoid or hedge against contingencies, effectu-
ation seeks to capitalize on these occurrences.
In other words, surprises can offer unexpected
opportunities as well as present unanticipated
problems. Contingencies don’t only undermine
the value of current means in achieving the goal,
but also provide opportunities to create new
value through those means in pursuit of new
goals. Therefore, stakeholders in the effectual
process deliberately keep open room for sur-
prises. In the case of KEEP180, for example,
if funding for a new transmitter falls apart, the
focus can go beyond absorbing that blow to find-
ing alternative funding in pursuit of operation
as a record label through a relationship created
with one of those withdrawing investors in the
transmitter.
The taxonomy in Figure 1 presents strategists
with interesting new possibilities in addition to
(a) trying harder to predict and position more accu-
rately, or (b) moving faster to adapt to rapidly
changing environments. Having all four quadrants
available for analysis opens up further possibilities
for theorizing and practice in strategic manage-
ment. In particular, it forces us to confront the
question: What are the advantages, if any, of not
trying to predict the future? There are at least two.
First, it points to creativity and entrepreneurship
as important elements of strategizing; second, it
makes strategizing cheaper by eliminating costs of
trying to predict the future as well reducing the
costs of failure.
Exogenous or preselected goals and environ-
ments are ways for problem solvers to reduce the
size and dimensionality of their problem space.
Creative problem solving, however, is about gener-
ating more alternatives (Wallace and Gruber, 1992)
and increasing the size and dimensionality of the
problem space. Creativity also is more about prob-
lem formulation than about problem solving. It is
certainly the case that strategy involves the gen-
eration of new alternatives in all four quadrants
of Figure 1. However, by making both the gener-
ation of new goals and new environments endoge-
nous to the strategy-making process, construction
demands and facilitates the widest possible inno-
vative range.
This is particularly the case in transformative
approaches given the emphasis on the co-creation
of goals with others, based on their means. This
quadrant calls for exaptive efforts, pulling those
means into new applications. According to Mokyr,
the basic idea of exaptation is that, ‘a technique
that was originally selected for one trait owes its
later success and survival to another trait which
it happens to possess’ (Mokyr, 2000: 57). In the
transformative quadrant strategists engage in exap-
tation whenever they ask, for any specific set of
preexisting resources, not only ‘What can we do
with these resources?’ but also ‘What else can we
do with them?’ (Dew, Sarasvathy, and Ventakara-
man, 2004). Continual imagination on a variety
of fronts including new goals, new means, new
environments and new institutions is a cornerstone
of transforming extant realities into new possibil-
ities. As a result, this perspective on control pro-
vides insight into how research in creativity and
entrepreneurship can connect more effectively to
strategy making under uncertainty.
In sum, whereas predictive strategies are ways
to manipulate current realities to reach preselected
goals, and adaptive strategies are ways to map
resources onto given environments, transforma-
tive strategies generate new goals and new envi-
ronments from current realities. Reconceptualiz-
ing prediction and control as independent sug-
gests new relationships between strategy making
and: (a) particular types of environments, such
as levels of uncertainty, institutional stability and
maturity, etc.; (b) specific aspects of dynamics
such as speed, magnitude, and quantity of changes
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over time, etc.; (c) various types of technological
regimes; (d) macro-economic factors; and (e) be-
havioral assumptions about the actors involved. We
leave these explorations to future endeavors, and
end by returning to the example of the radio station
KEEP180 and what it might do next.
CONCLUSION
If KEEP180 considers itself a radio station with a
specific market niche and a stable business model,
it might ask itself, ‘What should we do next to
serve our market?’ The answer will probably be
to invest in in-depth market research and tailor its
future strategies to predicted trends in its market
niche. If it believes more in its passion as a trend-
setter in music broadcasting, it will ask, ‘What
should we do next to achieve our vision?’ The
answer could be to try to expand its niche and cre-
ate new niches in alternate geographic regions or
through alternate media for propagating its music.
If it perceives its market is changing or that its
niche is being invaded by other competitors, it will
ask, ‘What can we do to respond?’ and hopefully
move quickly to adapt its products and business
model. But it can also assess its current situation,
both in terms of its resources and its product-
market positioning, and ask itself, ‘What else can
we do?’ In particular, it can engage and leverage
its stakeholders’ imagination and their expanding
network of relationships to come up with com-
pletely unanticipated new markets—sell sporting
goods, agricultural equipment, marine products,
lawn-mowers, and snowmobiles as J.B. Fuqua did,
or start a 24-hour TV news channel, the world’s
largest bison herd and a chain of restaurants, not
to mention millions of acres for conservation, as
Ted Turner did.2
Or, perhaps, join hands with another entrepre-
neur in the music business, Richard Branson, to
send rich tourists off to space, and who knows,
bring home the very first alien contact from Alpha
Centauri.3 The essence of non-predictive strategy
is that it is, well, unpredictable. What we argue
here is that emphasizing control and managing any
2 The early ventures of both Fuqua and Turner included radio
stations in Georgia.
3 Branson has recently founded Virgin Galactic, which, in part-
nership with Paul Allen and Burt Rutan (Designer of Spaceship
One, the first privately manned space flight) is planning to put
ordinary people into space by 2007.
failures it might entail—keeping them small and
quick—offers a whole new world of fascinating
intellectual opportunities for strategic management
and entrepreneurship.
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